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Abstract
Ransomware is increasingly posing a threat to the security of information resources. Millions of dollars of
monetary loss have been afflicted on end-users and corporations alike through unlawful deployment of
ransomware. Through malware injection into end-user devices and subsequent extortion of their system or data,
ransomware has emerged as a threat requiring immediate attention and containment by the cyber-security
community. We conduct a detailed analysis of the steps of execution involved in ransomware deployment to
facilitate readiness of the cyber-security community in containing the rapid proliferation of ransomware. This
paper examines the evolution of malware over a period of 26 years and the emergence of ransomware in the
cyber-threat landscape. Key findings on the evolution of ransomware and its use of emerging technologies are
presented.
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A HISTORICAL INSIGHT
Cyber-extorting malware has been evolving for almost three decades. Whilst malware developers adopt new
techniques to improve proliferation and evasion, security professionals respond reactively by playing catch-up.
Zero-day attacks are thus rampant; frequent variations in malware signatures encumber the detection process and
increase the level of risk that organisational networks face.
Cyber-extortion threats are not new, the widely reported PC CYBORG (AIDS) Trojan was the trendsetter in
1989. The strategies used by PC CYBORG are not too dissimilar to many new ransomware threats that have
emerged over the last decade. PC CYBORG was delivered electronically via an infected floppy-disk, the
installation used a dormancy period to evade users and authorities alike, which gave time for the malware to
spread. It locked access to user files by encrypting the content and finally used a socially engineered message to
claim the user was in ‘breach of a licencing agreement’ requiring it to pay $189 (via cheque posted to Panama)
in order for a licence renewal (and decryption) disk to be sent.
Much of the malware activity in the 1990s was from hobbyist hackers determined to prove their technical
prowess. It wasn’t until the early 2000’s that malware authors started to gain financial reaps directly and
malware became a profiteering business. Most profits were generated from: direct information theft; creation of
“botnets” for-hire; and advertising revenue (Bechtel, 2014). Malware authors also profited through theft of
banking credentials or sensitive passwords (Condon, 2012); or they amassed networks of malware compromised
machines constituting a network of bots and leased the network to the highest-bidders. Botnets had value
because cyber criminals could use them to launch large-scale cyber-attacks against corporate targets, run
phishing campaigns to steal credentials, or drop further malware that could scour users’ hard drives for personal
data and to assist in identity theft. Malware profits were dependent upon longevity i.e., persistence; by laying
low and doing no obvious harm, malware could persist for long enough to steal information, spamming or
powering botnets. The concept of extortion based malware – although present for over a decade – didn’t take off
as a financial model until around 2012.
Direct end-user extortion remained relatively unsophisticated until 2011; an era of “Fake AntiVirus” scams
relied on social engineering techniques to trick naive users in to paying for non-existent virus removal tools.
Many of these scams were eliminated by a crackdown on credit card payment facilities, the FakeAV threat dried
up almost overnight (Krebs, 2011). Somewhat more complex malware used denial-of-service tactics to “lock”
out a user from its system. These early “lockers” attacked the boot operations of a machine until a ransom was
paid (Pantanilla, 2012). Because the file system content remained un-touched, security professionals rapidly
adopted anti-virus recovery software to compensate. Although proposed by Young and Yung, 1996, the use of
strong encryption to create “reversible denial of service attack[s]” didn’t gain popularity until the first encrypting
locker PGPCoder/GPCode was released in 2005 (Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006a). GPCode represented the first
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real world implementation of the schemes proposed by Young and Yung; encrypting disk content and
demanding ransom payment. Many variants of GPCode contained flaws including poorly implemented
encryption routines, insecure encryption keys, or poor file deletion strategies, which allowed recovery of deleted
content; significantly however, GPCode continued to evolve, its deletion strategies became stronger and the
encryption schemes and key lengths improved over time.
Even with the advent of encrypting lockers, malware authors did not immediately adopt the direct end-user
ransom approach. Such type of extortion required many points of contact between the affected end-user,
payment gateways and the malware profiteer, encumbering the success in extortion. Ransomware needed a 3rd
party payment gateway provider to process payments; and it required direct communication with the attacker to
prove ransom payment and “reverse” the attack. Malware remained profitable primarily through information and
resource theft; direct end-user extortion still remaining too complicated and risky.
The perfect storm of ransomware needed three core technologies to align before it could become successful:


Requirement for strong, reversible encryption to lock up a user’s files,



Dependence on a system for anonymously communicate keys and decryption tools, and



Concealment i.e., setup of an untraceable way to pay the ransom.

The first ransomware to successfully combine these attributes was CTB-Locker; CTB standing for “Curve, TOR,
and Bitcoin”: elliptic curve cryptography provided fast secure encryption of file content. The Onion Routing
(TOR) protocol allowed anonymous communication; and Bitcoin enabled secure, untraceable crypto-cash
transactions. CTB-Locker was not without implementation flaws, however the business model made sense and
within a very short period ransomware began to take off growing by 500% as reported in 2013 (Wood, 2014).
Newer generations have started to spread to multiple platforms (BitDefender Labs, 2015; Kirk, 2015), seek out
network shares and removable media; strategies that increase the reach of the technology, as well as reduce the
effectiveness of network and external hard disk backups. If these traits prove to be effective, it is likely that new
ransomware variants will improve upon them. While large corporate backup solutions currently offer protection
against a wide range of threats, smaller organisations may not have sufficient financial or technical resources to
institute strong backup procedures.
While the concept of direct end-user extortion is terrifying and hones great media coverage; Kharraz et al. (2015)
suggest that ransomware may be relatively easily defeated. The authors noted that many ransomware samples
contained flaws or performed actions, which could be detected. They suggested that stopping ransomware
attacks might not be as difficult as it appears; however if history is to provide guidance, ransomware should not
be dismissed as a passing fad.
This research shows ransomware’s history of adapting to defensive strategies; it is only a matter of time until all
current protections are inadequate. It is essential that security professionals actively analyse and predict the
direction of ransomware development in order to pre-emptively develop secure technologies that protect endusers. Furthermore, the research shows the tenacity of ransomware developers; if the financial model evolves to
a point where large corporate networks become viable targets, then they too will need to deal with ransomware
threats.
Research design and method
The research sought to determine what features or ransomware have persisted over time. We addressed this
question by identifying these so as to facilitate prediction of the direction to be taken by future generations of
ransomware.
A survey was conducted on several major ransomware families. The goal was to formalise a nomenclature for
ransomware traits and identify what new traits were emerging over time. Twenty-nine variants in nine families
of frequently cited ransomware were identified from popular security and virus research blogs. Each ransomware
was individually researched to determine a release date and what features or traits it exhibited.
Twenty-two “traits” (features) were selected for analysis (Table 1). These traits described the technical design of
the ransomware from encryption technology through to payment options. The traits were selected based on
features frequently described by the security research blogs in which they were identified.
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Table 1 Ransomware selected for trait analysis
Name
PC CYBORG
One Half Virus

Date
1989-12-19
1994-10-31

GPcode

2004-12-01

GPCode.ac

2005-06-27

GPCode.ad
GPCode.ae

2006-04-14
2006-06-02

GPCode.af

2006-06-06

GPCode.af2

2006-06-06

GPCode.ag

2006-06-07

GPCode.ak

2008-06-05

GPCode.ax

2010-11-20

GPCode.bn
Reveton.2012
Cryptolocker

2011-03-26
2012-04-04
2013-05-09

Reveton.2013
Reveton.XY
CryptoLocker 2.0

2013-09-10
2013-10-22
2013-12-19

CryptoDefense

2014-03-26

CryptoDefense
CryptoWall

2014-04-01
2014-06-26

CTB-Locker

2014-07-15

Reveton.2014
CryptoWall 2.0

2014-08-19
2014-10-01

CryptoWall 3.0

2015-01-14

Reveton.2015
TeslaCrypt 0.2.5

2015-02-05
2015-02-14

TeslaCrypt 0.4.0

2015-02-14

TeslaCrypt 2.0.0

2015-07-13

TeslaCrypt 2.1

2015-09-07

Sources
(Smith, 2002)
(Trend Micro, 2000)
(Hoffman, n.d.)
(Emm, 2008)
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)
(F-Secure, 2005)
(Nazarov, Gostev & Shevchenko, 2006)
(Emm, 2008)
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)
(Alan, 2006)
(Alan, 2006)
(Emm, 2008)
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)
(Alan, 2006)
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)
(Waldron, 2006)
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)
(Nazarov & Emelyanova, 2006b)
(Keizer, 2008)
(AO Kaspersky Lab, 2005)
(Dunn, 2008)
(Tromer, 2008)
(Kamluk, 2010)
(Lemos, 2010)
(K, 2011)
(Brulez, 2011)
(Tikkanen & Karmina, 2012)
(Emsisoft Labs, 2013)
(Jarvis, 2013)
(Bottomley, 2015)
(Kujawa, 2013)
(Horejsi, 2013)
(Lipovsky, 2013)
(Pichel, 2013)
(Bottomley, 2015)
(Symantec Security Response, 2014)
(Abrams, 2014a)
(Abrams, 2014a)
(Subramaniam, 2014)
(Bottomley, 2015)
(Kafeine, 2014)
(Abrams, 2014b)
(AVAST Software, 2014)
(Allievi & Carter, 2015b)
(Olson, 2014)
(Code 42 Software, 2015)
(Bottomley, 2015)
(Allievi & Carter, 2015a)
(Code 42 Software, 2015)
(Bottomley, 2015)
(Saarinen, 2015)
(Sinitsyn, 2015)
(Bottomley, 2015)
(Sinitsyn, 2015)
(Bottomley, 2015)
(Duncan, 2015)
(Sinitsyn, 2015)
(Bottomley, 2015)
(Abrams, 2015)
(syntx, 2015)
(BloodDolly, 2015)
(Bottomley, 2015)
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The list of traits identified for analysis is defined as follows in Table 2:
Table 2 Ransomware traits and benefits conferred
Abbreviation
Encrypts

Trait
Encrypting

Strng Cphr
PKI

Strong Cypher
PKI

Autonomy

Autonomous

DGA

DGA

HiddenTOR

TOR

HiddenI2P

I2P

HideClient

Built in
TOR/I2P Client

SecureEnc

Cryptographical
ly Secure Data
Encryption

SecureKeys

Cryptographical
ly Secure Keys
Secure Key
Management

SecKeyMgmt

ScanNetDrv

Scans Network
Drives

SecErase

Securely Erases
Originals

PK DL

Public Key
Download

DH-ECC

DH-ECC PKI

C2 Server

Uses C2 Server

C2 Hidden

C2 on Hidden
Network

PayProcOK

Good Payment
Protocols

PayPrvider

Uses SemiAnonymous
Payment
Authority
Uses Crypto
Currency

CryptCash

StealCred
StealProc

Steals
Credentials
Steals
Processing

Description
The ransomware encrypts user file content as opposed to simply “locking” access
to the PC
The ransomware includes a strong and well implemented encryption cipher.
The use of PKI allows ransomware to encrypt content using a public key. The
attacker controls the secret part of the key and is the only actor capable of
decrypting the messages.
Autonomous destructive execution starts execution without the need to contact a
C2 server. Variants that require C2 communications before their destructive
routines start may be blocked by detecting network signatures.
Domain Generation Algorithms [DGA]s make take-downs of the C2 server more
difficult. With static IP and domains, authorities can work with ISPs and domain
registrars to block access to the offending servers. With a DGA, the server’s host
name is unpredictable, known only to the attacker.
Use of The Onion Routing [TOR] protocol provides a high degree of security and
anonymity to the attackers and their servers.
Uses the Invisible Internet Project [12P] network for communication. Similar to
the TOR network.
Anonymous network client built-in to the ransomware code. With a built in TOR
or I2P clients, the encrypted “circuits” are created internally, the data leaving the
infected machine is encrypted and the endpoints are concealed. This makes
detection and mitigation significantly harder.
The malware is theoretically secure i.e., the concepts employed are based on well
known and studied cryptographic principles. Tried and tested cryptography is
strong by design, the wider the distribution of the algorithms the more peer
review and the stronger the cryptographic design.
The keys used for encryption are of sufficient length and type to make cracking
the encrypted content impossible without the correct key.
Key management is core to cryptographic security, for symmetric cryptography
the keys cannot be permitted to persist on the hard disk or in memory. When
using PKI, the secrecy of the private-key is paramount to the security of the
whole cryptosystem.
The destructive code scans for files on external and network drives. This can be
especially destructive for business and corporate offices, it can also find and
encrypt network backups
Securely deletes the original “encrypted” version of the user’s files. Without
secure deletion and overwrite, it may be possible to recover file content from
internal operating system “shadow copies” or using file recovery software.
By creating server-side secret keys and releasing only public keys for infected
computers the encrypted data is protected. Infected users have no access to the
secret key which makes decryption impossible.
Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve Cryptography [DH-ECC] is used to generate
public keys. DH-ECC is a new generation of fast and very secure public key
algorithms.
Communicates with a command and control [C2] server to provide information
or receive processing data or instructions.
Command and control takes place over anonymous networks. This makes
takedowns of control servers more difficult as law enforcement and ISPs cannot
identify traffic content, specific Internet hosts, or domains in use.
The payment and verification protocol is secure; the ransomware has a reliable
way of verifying payments. This also means that the payment verification cannot
be faked or circumvented.
The malware uses an anonymous payment method. By using secure anonymous
payments the attackers can receive their cash without leaving a “paper trail”. All
centralised payment processors leave some type of paper trail; however, different
processors have different identity requirements for their clients.
Crypto currencies like Bitcoin offer secure, irreversible transactions. These types
of payments are equivalent to cash passed from one person to another. Some
ransomware also steal Bitcoins directly from electronic wallets.
Steals user login, banking or identity credentials in addition to ransom demand.
Uses the infected machine to perform computing or network operations in
addition to ransom demand. This could include password cracking, Bitcoin
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Abbreviation

Trait
Power

Description
mining, operating as part of a bot-net, or sending spam.

A ransomware traits matrix (Table 3) was produced to show the inclusion of “secure” traits and how they
evolved over time. The table includes the ransomware variant name, the approximate date it was first identified
and an assessment to identify whether specific traits were present and how well they were implemented.

RESULTS
Ransomware samples with first-observed dates ranging from December 1989 to July 2015 were identified. Of
the twenty-nine strains identified, over half (15) were released in the last two years. A clear increase in the rate
of new ransomware variants can be observed from Figure 1.
Examining the traits of the ransomware shows that while the first encrypting ransomware was uncovered in
1989, the first use of strong cryptographic principles was not until 2013, at which time ransomware began using
cryptographically secure encryption algorithms. Other significant improvements can be seen in the use of
anonymous networks like TOR and I2P and the introduction of crypto currencies. The use of anonymous hidden
networks first appeared in mid-2014 for payment verification; since then, three-quarters of the ransomware
variants observed used some type of anonymising service to enable secure communication. Crypto currencies
have also significantly impacted the ransomware threat landscape. Bitcoin was first used in 2013 by
Cryptolocker and again, approximately three-quarters of ransomware variants have included support for crypto
currencies.
The data shows the enhancements to ransomware as a malware tactic. A brief increase in the numbers of
ransomware variants during 2006-2007 was due to the introduction of the first variants of GPCode. Since 2010,
ransomware variants became even more prominent. Figure 1 shows that technologies including crypto currencies
and anonymous hidden networks are relatively new on the scene. The uptake of cryptocurrencies has been
significant between 2013 and 2015 and data regarding the use anonymous networks has just begun to emerge.
Moreover, the use of the TOR anonymization protocol saw a significant increase 2014 onwards.

PC CYBORG
One Half Virus
GPcode
GPCode.ac
GPCode.ad
GPCode.ae
GPCode.af
GPCode.af2
GPCode.ag
GPCode.ak
GPCode.ax
GPCode.bn
Reveton.2012
Cryptolocker
Reveton.2013
Reveton.XY
CryptoLocker 2.0
CryptoDefense
CryptoDefense
CryptoWall
CTB-Locker
Reveton.2014
CryptoWall 2.0
CryptoWall 3.0
Reveton.2015
TeslaCrypt 0.2.5
TeslaCrypt 0.4.0
TeslaCrypt 2.0.0

Date

1989-12-19
1994-10-31
2004-12-01
2005-06-27
2006-04-14
2006-06-02
2006-06-06
2006-06-06
2006-06-07
2008-06-05
2010-11-20
2011-03-26
2012-04-04
2013-05-09
2013-09-10
2013-10-22
2013-12-19
2014-03-26
2014-04-01
2014-06-26
2014-07-15
2014-08-19
2014-10-01
2015-01-14
2015-02-05
2015-02-14
2015-02-14
2015-07-13

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

x
x
x
√
√

o
o
o
o
o
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√ √ √

x
x
x
x
x
x
o
√
√

x
x
x
x
x
√
o
√
√

x
x
x
x
x
x
o
√
x

√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√ o
√
√ √ √
√ √ √
√
√ √
√ √
o
√ √ √ o

o
√
o
o
√
√
√
√
o
√
o
√
o
o
√ √ √
√
o
√
√
o
√
√
√
√
√ √
√
√ √
√ √

√ √ √ √

o

√
√
√
√
√

o
o
o
o
√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
x
√
√
√

√ √ √
√ √ √
√ √ x
√ √ o
√ √ o

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

CryptCash
StealCred
StealProc

Strain

Encrypts
Strng Cphr
PKI
Autonomy
DGA
HiddenTOR
HiddenI2P
HideClient
SecureEnc
SecureKeys
SecKeyMgmt
ScanNetDrv
SecErase
PK DL
DH-ECC
C2 Server
C2 Hidden
PayProcOK
PayPrvider

Table 3 Matrix of ransomware security traits for selected strains

√
√
√

o
o

√
√
√
o
√

o
o
o √
√
√
o √
x
√
√

√
√
o
√
√
o
√
√
√

√ √
√ √
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TeslaCrypt 2.1

2015-09-07

CryptCash
StealCred
StealProc

Date

Encrypts
Strng Cphr
PKI
Autonomy
DGA
HiddenTOR
HiddenI2P
HideClient
SecureEnc
SecureKeys
SecKeyMgmt
ScanNetDrv
SecErase
PK DL
DH-ECC
C2 Server
C2 Hidden
PayProcOK
PayPrvider

Strain

√ √ √ o

√

√

√ √ √ √ √

√ √ √ √

√ = well implemented; o = not fully implemented; x = implementation broken

A brief increase was noticed during 2006-2007 through introduction of first variants of GPCode, since 2010
ransomware variants become more prominent. Figure 1 shows that technologies including crypto currencies and
anonymous hidden networks are relatively new on the scene. The uptake of crypto currencies has been
significant between 2013 and 2015 and data regarding the use anonymous networks has just begun to emerge.
Ransomware strains surveyed and use of new technologies
14

12

10

8
# of strains surveyed
Bitcoin Uptake
6

TOR Uptake

4

2

0
< 2004

2004-2005

2006-2007

2008-2009

2010-2011

2012-2013

2014+

Figure 1 Increase in ransomware strains and security features identified over time
Another trend shows the increasing use of multiple security features and technologies; original ransomware
variants were very simple by comparison. The data indicate that many current variants of ransomware have
copied code and features from predecessors. An exception is a ransomware suite called Reveton, which has been
through many revisions since 2012 and is still in circulation today, even with minor variations from one version
to another. A closer examination of Reveton features indicate that it’s “locking” performs no encryption it
simply locks the "boot process" to interrupt standard PC operation.

DISCUSSION
The data show the general trend of ransomware to build on the technologies of previous generations. They also
show that the encrypting ransomware is on the increase, each generation is building on the successes (and fixing
the errors) of previous generations. In some cases as with early versions of GPCode, rapid iterations can be seen.
Each new version of GPCode quickly plugged the holes and errors of the previous version. The result of these
rapid updates was that GPCode became “unbreakable” in less than five years. The lessons learned and published
vulnerability analysis has also taught other developers what GPCode did wrong; since GPCode.ax, no significant
encrypting ransomware has utilised poor RSA key lengths or constructs.
The significant developments over time have been the addition of increasingly secure algorithms and key
management methodologies. The evolutions have also shown a migration away from “home-brew” encryption
routines to well established and proven cryptographic constructions. Most new secure variants of encrypting
ransomware use a combination of: public key cryptography; >AES-256 block ciphers; remote public key
generation; and C2 server communication.
One interesting variant that persists despite lacking any encryption features is Reveton. All variants perform
locking operations based on interrupting the normal boot sequence. This attack is relatively easily circumvented
and clean from an infected PC. A brief search through the literature on Reveton indicates that the locking
component of the malware may be incidental to its other operations which include: password and credential
stealing; Bitcoin mining (a legitimate process); and stealing of Bitcoin wallets (Kujawa, 2013) (Saarinen, 2015).
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The ransom component apparently offers little benefit other than to frustrate user access to an infected PC while
other malicious activities are taking place.
The recent emergence of TOR and I2P anonymous networks as a communication channel shows promise;
logically, these encrypted and hidden networks provide malicious attackers another level of anonymity. There
appears to be a general uptake of the technology, however the limited data makes it difficult to forecast future
trends. It may be that TOR and I2P are too complicated for easy implementation; however, if other technologies
are to provide any guidance, the learning experiences from each generation provide improved models for future
developments.
One example of the rapid absorption of new technologies can be seen in the increasing use of the Bitcoin crypto
currency as a payment method. This may be due to well-documented Bitcoin protocols and the widely publicised
Bitcoin brand (Bitcoin Project, 2015). Implementation of Bitcoin payments requires very little overhead and may
even be easier than clearing payments through conventional payment gateways and prepaid “debit” cards. The
laundering and liquidation of Bitcoin assets is also a relatively straightforward process, with the protocol
allowing “coins” to be combined and spilt arbitrarily. Traceability of Bitcoins is a field of active research (Reid
& Harrigan, 2011), however the general user perception is that Bitcoin transactions are completely un-traceable;
certainly they offer far greater anonymity than other online payment methods.

CONCLUSION
Through this paper we have presented a categorisation and an analysis of several key features of ransomware. In
addition, we presented the evolution of ransomware over a period of twenty-six years. The environment of
ransomware proliferation and its widespread and menacing threat landscape was also analysed.
Risks to corporate data are often mitigated through active security management, documented security policies,
controlled access environments, skilled security personnel and enterprise firewalls and backup solutions.
However, it is difficult to believe the technical or financial resources available to smaller organisations and
individuals will be sufficient to protect against this rapidly evolving threat. The current state of malware research
is very limited in contribution. Unlike vulnerability analysis – which is well documented in exploit databases –
malware research and analysis is lacking peer-reviewed data resources and standardised analysis of malware
development. Whilst malware analysis is conducted on an individual or a software manufacturer level, the
opportunity exists to create a formal approach and vocabulary for convenient analysis of malware, variants and
evolution.
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